Beyond the Poverty Agenda? Insights from the New Politics of Development in Uganda  by Hickey, Sam
World Development Vol. 43, pp. 194–206, 2013
 2012 Elsevier Ltd.
0305-750X
Open access under CC BY license.www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.09.007Beyond the Poverty Agenda? Insights from the New Politics
of Development in UgandaSAM HICKEY *
University of Manchester, UKSummary. — The politics of development has shifted signiﬁcantly in recent years, with largely negative implications for the poverty
agenda. This is particularly apparent in countries like Uganda where “poverty reduction papers” have been displaced by national devel-
opment plans aimed at “structural transformation,” driven by the discovery of oil, the growing inﬂuence of rising powers vis-a`-vis tra-
ditional donors and domestic political shifts. Although this heralds the possibility of deeper national ownership over development policy,
international ﬁnancial institutions have adopted strategies to maintain their inﬂuence. Moreover, Uganda currently lacks the underlying
political capacities and relationships required to roll out this ambitious new agenda.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd.
Key words — Uganda, Africa, poverty, paradigm shift, developmental state, IFIs
Open access under CC BY license.* I am very grateful to all of those who have contributed their time and
insights to this research, particularly those working in Uganda who agreed
to repeat meetings over the last few years. Many thanks also to Badru
Bukenya, a Ph.D. candidate at IDPM, for his excellent research assistance
on this project since 2010. This version of the paper has beneﬁted from the
insightful comments of Keith Muhakanizi, Simon Kenny, Kasingye Ky-
amugambi, David Rider-Smith, Martin Brownbridge, Godfrey Bahiigwa,
Richard Ssewakiryanga, and Adam Branch. Useful comments were also
received during presentations of various versions of this paper in Kamp-
ala, Manchester, Oxford and Sheﬃeld. This research has been carried out
within the Chronic Poverty Research Centre, which was funded from 2001
to 2010 by the United Kingdom Department for International Develop-
ment. The analysis and arguments are the author’s alone. Final revision
accepted: September 7, 2012.1. INTRODUCTION
The politics of development underwent signiﬁcant shifts
during the ﬁrst decade of the 21 century. The moment of pov-
erty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals, which
from 1999 appeared to join if not fully displace market-driven
neoliberalism in the Post-Washington Consensus (PWC) (Onis
& Senses, 2005), now seems to have given way to a more ambi-
tious development agenda aimed at “structural transforma-
tion.” A series of factors, including the ﬁnancial crisis of
2008, the leftist wave in Latin America, and the new resources
and ideas made available by both the growing inﬂuence of ris-
ing powers and also new natural resource ﬁnds in several
countries, have undermined both the ideological and institu-
tional basis of the PWC, and oﬀered developing countries
the possibility of devising more productivist and nationally-
owned development strategies (e.g., Birdsall & Fukuyama,
2011; Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2012; Power & Mohan, 2010;
Whitﬁeld, 2009). These shifts have loosened the inﬂuence of
those most clearly aligned with the promotion of both neolib-
eral policies and the poverty agenda, including transnational
corporations (for neoliberalism) and many traditional donors
(for both). In an important book on the politics of aid in
Africa, Lindsay Whitﬁeld notes that the international and
ideological conditions are increasingly in place for a new, more
autonomous approach development policy to take hold within
Africa, and that many developing countries:
“have started kicking against the limited vision of the Millennium
Development Goals, the narrow poverty focus on PRSPs, and to some
extent aid-funded growth, and some are clearly looking outside Africa
for ideological inspiration” (Whitﬁeld, 2009, p. 367).
However, she concludes that “. . .these trends have not yet
made their mark in terms of inspiring governments” develop-
ment plans, strategies, or public policies’ (op. cit.). This paper
argues that we can now see these developments playing out in
Africa, and also that the new paradigm of development as
“structural transformation” appears to be gaining more trac-
tion at the national level than the PWC managed to achieve,
despite the rhetoric of “ownership” that accompanied its
emblematic modality, namely the poverty reduction strategy
paper (PRSP) experiment. PRSPs have been increasingly194rejected by developing country governments in favor of a re-
turn to a national development planning approach, a shift that
encompasses Asia (e.g., Cambodia), Latin America (e.g.,
Nicaragua, Bolivia), and Africa (e.g., Malawi, Uganda, and
Zambia). Even where PRSP-speak remains in place, as in
Ghana, the emphasis has changed to “Growth and Poverty
Reduction Strategy,” and to achieving middle-income status
rather than simply alleviating poverty.
However, the image of Africa taking control of its develop-
ment agenda has become further confused since Whitﬁeld’s
important intervention as the World Bank has apparently
shifted its ideological position to embrace the new paradigm.
In a speech at Georgetown University in September 2010 the
President of the World Bank noted that “As economic tectonic
plates have shifted, paradigms must shift too. . . This is no
longer about the Washington Consensus (but about) securing
transformation.” In response to the drivers outlined above,
and possibly also its own research into development success, 1
the Bank now promotes a “new structural economics” (Lin,
2010), which promises a more ambitious development agenda
that is more carefully tailored and contextualized to the
speciﬁc characteristics of particular countries.
Uganda’s new National Development Plan (NDP) is a
particularly interesting exemplar of this new politics of devel-
opment, in ways that has resonance beyond its borders.
Launched in 2010, the NDP emerged in response to shifts in
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at national and global levels, which eﬀectively undermined the
key drivers and relationships that had underpinned the pov-
erty agenda. Having been once considered the showcase of lib-
eralization under the Washington Consensus and then of
poverty reduction under the PWC, the question thus arises
once more as to whether Uganda is again showcasing a new
development paradigm, as the Government of Uganda claims,
based on greater national ownership and more progressive
possibilities in terms of both accumulation and redistribution.
Uganda’s new ﬁve-year Plan refers not to “poverty” but to
“transformation” and “prosperity,” terms which had already
been popularized by President Museveni during the 2006 elec-
tion campaign and which broadly reﬂect a “Southern Consen-
sus” (Gore, 2000) that appears to owe more to learning lessons
from East Asia than Washington.
However, whether this constitutes a new paradigm for devel-
opment remains a moot point. Although more clearly owned
and controlled by the government of Uganda than the erst-
while Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), the interna-
tional ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs) have remained inﬂuential
in shaping both the process and content of the NDP
(Sheppard & Leitner, 2010), in part through the ideological
re-invention noted above. And while the achievement of struc-
tural transformation should lead to more sustainable forms of
poverty reduction over the long-run, the redistributive aspects
of this new agenda remain poorly articulated, particularly in
terms of employment and agriculture. The forthcoming ﬂow
of oil wealth oﬀers signiﬁcant challenges as well as opportuni-
ties for this agenda, particularly in terms of achieving labor-
intensive growth and avoiding the governance problems
associated with oil (Ross, 2012). Over the longer-term, then,
it is unclear as to which types of capital accumulation and
associated forms of political order (Ferguson, 2006) will pre-
vail in Uganda as it moves to exploit the signiﬁcant reserves
of oil that should start to ﬂow later this decade. As such,
Uganda reﬂects and reveals the more general ambiguities that
characterize many African countries within this new ideologi-
cal and political economy context (Carmody, 2009).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy outlines the
politics that underpinned the poverty agenda in Uganda from
around 1996 until the mid-2000s, before identifying a number
of key changes within the politics of development which con-
verged around 2005–06. Section 3 details the process through
which the NDP was produced, highlighting the continuities
and discontinuities with the usual PRSP-process, and assesses
the inﬂuence of the Plan over subsequent budgetary alloca-
tions. Section 4 discusses whether the NDP agenda can be con-
sidered to be pro-poor and whether it reﬂects a paradigmatic
shift within development thinking. Section 5 explores the ques-
tion of who controls the new development agenda in Uganda,
and (brieﬂy) whether this new development agenda is likely to
be implemented, before Section 6 concludes.
The evidence for this paper draws on successive research
trips to Uganda between 2005 and 2011, the most recent being
over May–June 2010, February 2011, and June 2011. The re-
search included over 80 interviews with key informants drawn
from all institutional stakeholders, including government, do-
nor agencies, parliamentarians, local government oﬃcials, and
civil society (including journalists, academics, and oﬃcials of
non-governmental organizations or NGOs). These visits were
largely timed to ﬁt with key moments in the NDP process,
including the ﬁrst meetings of the PEAP-revision process in
2007, the shift in leadership over the process from the Ministry
of Finance to the National Planning Authority (NPA) in 2008,
the launch of the NDP in the spring of 2010, the 2011 electionsand both the 2010–11 and 2011–12 budget speeches. This
enabled direct insights into the process as it unfolded (e.g.,
participation in the ﬁrst NDP planning meeting in May 2010
after the NDP launch in April) and when events were still fresh
in respondents’ minds. Successive drafts of this paper were
then circulated to key insiders in the process in order to ensure
as much accuracy as possible.2. THE SHIFTING POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT IN
UGANDA: FROM 1996 TO 2006 WATERSHED
(a) The politics of the poverty agenda: 1996–2006
Uganda’s much vaunted “ownership” of the global poverty
agenda is often discussed in terms of the country’s PEAP, the
country’s forerunner of the PRSP-experiment. Along with
further measures taken to promote and protect pro-poor
expenditures in the budgetary process (e.g., Foster & Mijumbi,
2001; Piron & Norton, 2004), most notably the Poverty Action
Fund which ring-fenced ﬁnance from debt-relief for areas of
government expenditure deemed to be pro-poor, expenditure
in the areas of education and health increased from 18% to
35% of the budget between 1997 and 2005 (Piron & Norton,
2004, p. 14). The sense of Uganda as a paragon of pro-poor
politics (Mosley, 2012) was further underlined by its earlier
success in signiﬁcantly reducing poverty and vulnerability dur-
ing the 1990s, most notably through the liberalization of coﬀee
marketing (Dijkstra & van Donge, 2001) and also the strong
role played by President Museveni in reducing the prevalence
of HIV-AIDS (Putzel, 2004) .
However, the story was never quite so straightforward, not
least in the apparent air-brushing of the long-running civil
conﬂict in the North and the Government’s complicity with
this (Branch, 2005). It is also now increasingly clear that the
consensus around poverty reduction in Uganda that devel-
oped in the late 1990s was only held together by a particular
set of political and political economy circumstances. Uganda’s
high-level of indebtedness and dependence on foreign aid was
critical here: the fact that around half of the entire budget was
externally ﬁnanced for much of the 1990s meant that donors
wielded a large inﬂuence over the government’s policy direc-
tion, including those donors such as World Bank and DFID
who were both powerful in Uganda and the most enthusiastic
promoters of the new poverty agenda (Hulme, 2010). At the
same, donors were looking for a success story which could
be used to justify their new approach, and were willing to over-
look the Government’s tendencies in other areas, most notably
the opposition to multi-party politics, growing levels of cor-
ruption and military involvement in the Congo. This symbi-
otic relationship was re-enforced following the 9/11
bombings in 2001, whereupon President Museveni reposi-
tioned his struggle against rebels in northern Uganda as part
of the global “war on terror,” and received signiﬁcantly in-
creased support from the United States in return (Hickey,
2003, 38).
This convergence of transnational and domestic political
imperatives around a pro-poor policy agenda was particularly
apparent during the late 1990s with the early adoption of the
PRSP, an agenda that was taken up enthusiastically by both
the Ministry of Finance and civil society organizations as well
as promoted by donors, the three sides of what Gould (2005)
has referred to as the “iron triangle” of PRSP-processes. 2 Do-
nors had long concentrated their eﬀorts on building up levels
of capacity and commitment within Uganda’s Ministry of Fi-
nance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED), and
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related reforms (Mugambe, 2010), from the integration of
poverty diagnostics into policy-making through to the protec-
tion of poverty-related expenditures in budgetary processes.
However, domestic politics also played a key role in shaping
development policy in Uganda. The Presidential and no-party
parliamentary elections of 1996 and 2001 provided timely
incentives for the executive to introduce populist reforms
couched in the language of poverty reduction. The most nota-
ble of these were the introduction of Universal Primary Edu-
cation after the 1996 elections and the abolishment of user
fees in health around the 2001 polls, both of which resulted
from grassroots campaigning and presidential initiatives
rather than through formal PEAP consultations. Such reforms
were further enabled by the largely untrammeled policy-mak-
ing powers oﬀered by the no-party, and increasingly presiden-
tialized nature of the political system.
However, the drivers of the poverty agenda in Uganda were
not entirely instrumental and self-interested. Several stake-
holders clearly held an ideological commitment to poverty
reduction at some level, including donors, NGOs, bureaucrats
and, in broad terms at least, the President, who had long artic-
ulated a vision of development as located within a broader
agenda of nation-rebuilding (Hickey, 2005; NRM, 1999; Piron
& Norton, 2004). Heralding the shift explored here, some ear-
lier policy initiatives had been explicitly framed in terms of
“modernization” rather than poverty reduction, as with the
ambitious Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture
(Bahiigwa, Rigby, & Woodhouse, 2005). 3
This convergence of political and political economy factors
took tangible form on the ground through speciﬁc relation-
ships between policy actors, including those between the
President and key international donors, politicians and tech-
nocrats, and state and civil society. Uganda clearly emerges
here as a “governance” state (Harrison, 2004) within which
global players and non-state actors play roles in nominally
domestic policy processes, making it less useful to refer to
the relative power of internal and external actors than to
examine their cross-cutting relationships. Among the most
notable of these relationships was the one established across
what Kanbur (2001) has described as the “Finance Ministry”
and “Civil Society” policy tendencies. 4 This was signiﬁed
most clearly by the ways in which the “voices of the poor”
were brought directly within MFPED through Uganda’s
Participatory Poverty Assessment (UPPAP, Brock, McGee,
& Ssewakiryanga, 2002), while civil society organizations were
also heavily involved in PEAP consultations and the sector
working groups established to lead on policy-making. It was
these relationships that both embodied the PWC and enabled
its rolling out on the ground, both in Uganda but also else-
where. However, by the early 2000s the political and political
economy conditions that underpinned these relationships
had already started to shift, before the watershed of 2006
fundamentally altered the relational basis of development
policy-making and put in place the drivers of the new agenda.
(b) A transition period: The PEAP runs out of steam
By the time the PEAP was undergoing its third iteration
(2004–2007), there were already signs that it was running out
of political steam and also of a drift away from a poverty focus
within government (Hickey, 2005). Successive Presidential
statements during the early 2000s revealed a growing level of
dissatisfaction with the PEAP process and agenda, which
was seen as dominated by donors, technocrats, and civil soci-
ety consultations and divergent with the President’s moreambitious “modernization” agenda. 5 Such concerns were
given further momentum by the release of oﬃcial government
data in 2005 that showed reduced rates of economic growth
and poverty reduction. Although the disappointing growth ﬁg-
ures were later found to be largely erroneous (due to a prob-
lem with the national accounts), the sense that a change of
policy direction was required had become etched within the
mindsets of leading technocrats and politicians alike (Inter-
view data, May–June 2010). The results of the National
Household Survey for 2005, which seemed to show that
growth was the key driver of whatever poverty reduction
had occurred, was also inﬂuential, increasing the sense that
the focus on social sector expenditure within PEAP was some-
how missing the point and strengthening the rationale for a
more “productivist” focus on growth. High rates of economic
growth for over a decade had also helped create pressure for
improved energy and transport infrastructure to cope with in-
creased levels of traﬃc and business activity (Interview with
senior MFPED oﬃcial, February 2011).
A growing disenchantment with the PEAP process and agen-
da was clearly identiﬁable by around 2004–5. Politicians steered
clear of the process of producing the third PEAP, whichwas lar-
gely dominated by technocrats and resulted in a Plan that
lacked the populist ﬂavor of its predecessors (Canagarajah &
vanDiesen, 2006). Its lack of political appeal was further under-
lined when the President initially refused to sign it (Interview
with MFPED oﬃcial, September 2008). However, this disen-
chantment would not gain programmatic coherence until the
third PEAP had run its course and would come up for review
in 2006–7. By then the politics and political economy of devel-
opment in Uganda would have shifted decisively in ways that
would unravel the relationships underpinning the poverty
agenda, largely through the return of multi-party politics, a
declining reliance on aid, the discovery of large oil reserves,
and the growing interest of rising powers, particularly China.
(c) From poverty to prosperity for all under multi-party politics
The return of multi-party politics to Uganda in 2005, cou-
pled with the President securing the constitutional grounds
for gaining re-election by overturning the two-term limit for
sitting presidents, 6 increased the incentives for the NRM re-
gime to re-gain control over development policy as a means
of mobilizing electoral support. Returning to their constituen-
cies to campaign for the 2006 elections, politicians were re-
galed with tales of failed service delivery by their
constituents (Interviews with government oﬃcials, February
2011). Tasked with mounting an electoral campaign as a polit-
ical party rather than a “movement,” the NRM deployed the
language of “Prosperity for All” rather than mere poverty
reduction, and thereafter sought to devise initiatives to realize
this, including an emphasis on microﬁnance programs that
was reminiscent of earlier attempts to promote microcredit
around election times (Muhumuza, 2007). Although patchily
implemented on the ground (Interviews with agricultural sec-
tor experts, May 2010), “Prosperity for All” signaled an
important shift away from the poverty agenda, as reﬂected
in a frequent refrain from government oﬃcials at this time
such that “we’ve had enough of looking at poverty,” with
one saying “forget about the poor, we need growth ﬁrst”
(Interview with donor oﬃcial, September 2008). The shift
was not merely discursive but also materialistic: as reﬂected
in successive Background to the Budget Papers from 2006 on-
wards, “Budget patterns have shifted toward priorities out-
lined in the NRM Manifesto rather than PEAP, which has
struggled to remain relevant” (Interview, September 2008). 7
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development
Crucially, 2006 also witnessed signiﬁcant changes within
political economy of development in Uganda, most notably
its graduation away from highly-indebted poor country
(HIPC) status, the discovery of signiﬁcant oil reserves, and a
declining reliance on international aid. As indicated in Figure 1
below, Uganda has reversed its level of reliance on aid and is
set to further increase the extent to which the budget is funded
from domestic revenues.
This derives, to an extent, from the discovery of large oil re-
serves and the resulting inﬂow of investment. The identiﬁca-
tion of untapped oil reserves in the Albertine area in the
early 2000s attracted the interest of China, Libya, and Iran,
as well as oil companies from France, Britain, and Ireland. 8
However, it was only in 2006 that estimates revealed that up
to two billion barrels of oil were available for exploitation.
2006 was also the year of the Sino-Africa pact that saw the
GoU sign six agreements around key areas of the economy,
including trade, investment, water conservation, agriculture,
infrastructure, telecommunications, energy, textiles, human re-
source development, and agro-processing. Although direct
revenues from oil are not expected to start ﬂowing in Uganda
until late in this decade, the presence of oil has attracted an
estimated $3 billion in exploration investments since 2006
(The East African, 25 February 2012). In October 2010, Tul-
low Oil (one of the two main companies involved in exploiting
Uganda’s reserves) was given the go-ahead to sell rights to the
China National Oﬀshore Oil Corporation and also the French
company TOTAL in a farm-down deal worth $1.45bn (Wall
Street Journal, 19/10/2010), that was ﬁnally signed in Febru-
ary 2012 (East African, 25/02/2012).
This marks a steep upward trajectory regarding China’s
involvement in Uganda, which although ongoing since 1962
only became signiﬁcant in the 2000s. By 2010 China had be-
come the lead investor in Uganda with a hand in most key sec-
tors, although according to a recent report from the Uganda
Investment Authority (New Vision, 20/10/2010) it is only
approaching dominance in some of these (manufacturing
and increasingly construction, roads, and oil). 9 Government
bureaucrats remain wary of accepting too much ﬁnance from
China, particularly regarding the risk of increased indebted-
ness and taking on supply- rather than demand-led projects
(Interviews June 2010, February 2011, June 2011),Figure 1. Domestic/foreign shares of Uganda’s budget. Sources: 2003–4 (BTTB
2011–12 (budget speecNonetheless, China’s involvement in several mega-projects,
from the Namboole Stadium to the new $25 million oﬃce
block for the President and Prime Minister, has given it a high
proﬁle. In terms of development assistance, it is diﬃcult to
track China’s aid contributions, not least because it is not a
member of OECD-DAC and does not attend joint donor
meetings. However, China appears to be following the ap-
proach it has employed elsewhere in Africa (Brautigam,
2009; Power & Mohan, 2010), whereby aid is given mainly
for infrastructural development and business, with relatively
few conditions attached beyond a preference for the use of la-
bor and materials imported from China (EPRC, 2007, 21).
This converges closely with the President’s renewed interest
in structural transformation for Uganda, and it is clear that
the new inﬂux of funding related to oil and China has had a
direct inﬂuence on budgetary and policy shifts in Uganda over
the past few years. According to one senior source within
MFPED,
“. . .China has more resources along with our own monies from
oil—this combination is bringing this type of shift. . . Our own
revenues have been increasing, so we are reducing our dependency
on traditional donors, who are also reducing their expenditure. Which
came ﬁrst, the new policy ideas (around transformation) or the new
sources of funding? The funding probably, although the shift to pro-
ductivity in last PEAP was based on money from traditional donors
and ourselves, but once those sources of revenue became available
from China and oil it gave real energy to the process (Interview,
February 2011).
As such, the new political economy of development that
emerged during the mid-2000s can be linked directly to
changes in the nature and substance of policy debates and
budgetary allocations in Uganda from this time onwards. As
discussed in more detail below, the NDP’s move away from
poverty and to structural transformation can be seen as the
most notable exemplar of this broader shift.3. UGANDA’S NDP
Having established that 2006 marked a critical turning point
for the politics of development in Uganda, this section details
the process through which what came to be known as the
NDP was conceived and launched, with a particular focus
on the emergence of new sets of relationships between key
players within Uganda’s development policy process.2009–10); 2004–7 (BTTB 2010–11); 2007–08–2010–11 (BTTB 2011:43);
h 2011). *Budget.
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As the third PEAP drew to a close in 2007, a PEAP Revision
Task Force was established within MFPED. Reﬂecting the
disquiet noted above, the government also commissioned a
UK consultancy ﬁrm to undertake an evaluation of the whole
PEAP experiment. 10 The Task Force brought together the
three key stakeholders in the process, namely MFPED, the Of-
ﬁce of the Prime Minister (OPM), and the NPA. The President
was determined to use a longer planning cycle than the three-
year PEAP to help deal with the challenge of securing trans-
formation. This move was conﬁrmed during a parliamentary
debate in 2007, after which Cabinet announced a return to na-
tional development planning, to be produced for 5, 10, and
30 year time periods. Produced in September 2007, the ﬁrst
“national Development Plan” concept note referred to “pros-
perity” rather than “poverty” in its title, but setting out a lar-
gely familiar process for the review. Sector working groups,
each with the usual inclusion of donors and civil society orga-
nizations, would produce strategic papers that would form
draft chapters for the Plan. However, this consultative mode
was rejected by MFPED’s Permanent Secretary, who directed
the Task Force to instead identify the key drivers of growth
using a form of macroeconomic modelling similar to that em-
ployed by the World Bank. This would oﬀer a very diﬀerent
analytical basis compared to the poverty diagnostics per-
formed for the PEAP, especially as there were no plans to
re-commission either UPPAP or the Poverty Status Reports. 11
When the process was oﬃcially launched in November 2007,
only a small group of civil society organizations and donors
were belatedly invited, underlining the sense that the key play-
ers from the ’civil society tendency’ would be less involved this
time around (Interview with donor oﬃcial, September 2008).
However, this exclusion of donors from the initial stages of
formulating the NDP (also noted by Kjaer and Muhumuza
(2009)), tends to obscure the strong sense in which the IFIs
in particular remained inﬂuential. The World Bank’s Country
Memorandum paper for Uganda was released in September
2007, and focused on identifying and overcoming the “binding
constraints” to growth and structural transformation, includ-
ing through a focus on infrastructure and industrialization,
while an IMF study released around the same time stressed
similar concerns (Selassie, 2008). This analytical work to cod-
ify the new post-PWC ideological dispensation around struc-
tural transformation into policy-relevant terms was highly
inﬂuential in Uganda, where it converged with the renewed
political discourse around “transformation.” Interviews with
key policy actors reveal how ingrained the Bank Memo’s lan-
guage of “binding constraints” has become within Uganda’s
policy discourse on development, an inﬂuence that also ex-
tended into the realm of budgetary allocations. According to
a senior source in MFPED’s Treasury department, “the work
done by the World Bank, that Country Memo. . .that inﬂu-
enced us to shift resources. . .,” as evidenced in particular by
the dramatic funding increases for roads in the subsequent
budget for 2008–09 (Figure 3). The IFIs, operating in “knowl-
edge broker” mode, would also closely shape the NDP.
(b) The NPA takes over
Progress on the NDP was delayed through much of 2008, in
part because of a longstanding struggle between MFPED and
NPA. Although the 1995 Constitution accorded NPA formal
responsibility over national planning, “. . .MFPED delayed
its establishment for as long as it could,” until in 2002, “Par-
liament ensured it (the NPA) became an institutional reality”(Whitworth & Williamson, 2010, 24). NPA would remain un-
der the jurisdiction of MFPED, and with any return to the
earlier separation of planning and budgeting functions ruled
out (Whitworth & Williamson, 2010), with MFPED eventu-
ally agreeing that NPA should take up leadership of the
NDP process. In order to help support the under-capacity
NPA in this, MFPED’s Economic Policy and Research
Department provided technical backstopping services to
NPA and its erstwhile Commissioner was appointed as the
new Executive Director of NPA in February 2009. This insti-
tutional shift was important, and would provide a new space
within which a more ambitious and politically-attuned ap-
proach to development policy would take shape. 12
In late 2008 NPA established a Core Technical Committee
to co-ordinate and drive the NDP process. This consisted of
representatives from NPA, MFPED, and OPM, along with
one representative each from the key private sector and civil
society umbrella associations, and other co-opted members.
The process was markedly less inclusive than with the PEAP,
with the focus switching instead to learning lessons from suc-
cessful post-war developers, including Malaysia, Korea, and
China, through literature reviews and talks from visiting ex-
perts. Task Forces were established for key sectors and
charged with producing thematic papers. These were com-
posed primarily of government oﬃcials and were supposed
to mark a break with the more donor-driven and consultative
Sector Working Groups. The ﬁrst phase of consultation was
with local governments, 13 after which three workshops were
held with parliamentarians and political parties were also
called for a meeting to discuss the NDP in November 2009.
Although some civil society representatives were included in
the Task Forces, NGOs bemoaned the lack of communication
from NPA as to whether or not their inputs were being used
(Interviews with NGO leaders 2008, 2011). Frustrated, a small
group of NGO leaders produced their own report entitled
Unlocking Uganda’s Development Potential in July 2009. How-
ever, the report was poorly distributed, and those involved saw
little evidence of any inﬂuence on the NDP, unlike with previ-
ous PEAPs (Interviews with NGO leaders 2008, 2010, 2011).
By contrast, private sector representatives report that the pri-
orities emerging during the NDP process, particularly around
infrastructure, directly captured their submissions and also the
priorities outlined in the Private Sector Foundation’s own
strategic report (Interviews, June 2010).
Donors remained at arms length, with NPA framing the
NDP process as a national duty, as reﬂected in the role played
by an informal gathering organized by the NPA Chairman
known as the “Patriotic Club.” The Patriotic Club, which often
met at the NPA headquarters after oﬃce hours, involved erst-
while ministers, researchers, and civil servants debating and
working long hours to help get the draft Plan into shape.
Although NPA requested that donors fund two international
consultants to help with the ﬁnal drafting of the report, the
majority of the writing was done by Ugandan sector experts
along with two other Ugandan nationals, including an aca-
demic then based at the Economic Policy and Research Centre.
(c) Toward the NDP launch
In October 2009, OPM helped facilitate a Cabinet retreat
where a preliminary version of the NDP was presented. A ﬁrst
full draft was then produced in December 2009 for a second
Cabinet retreat before broader consultations were held with
parliament, the private sector, civil society, and donors. Pres-
idential involvement appeared to increase markedly at this
stage, with one insider claiming that “He was really driving
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2011 elections now coming clearly into view. The President
held at least three meetings with NPA oﬃcials along with sev-
eral other bilateral meetings and telephone calls with the NPA
Chairman, and is said to have provided many hand-written
comments on the draft.
However, the ambitious public investments outlined in the
ﬁrst fully-costed Plan raised alarm bells within the Bank of
Uganda (BoU), parts of the Ministry of Finance and also
the IMF. If fully funded, the draft NDP would leave govern-
ment with a budget deﬁcit of around 14%, an anathema to
Uganda’s Finance Ministry tendency, which was proud of
having hardwired macroeconomic stability and ﬁscal prudence
into government since 1992 (Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2010, pp.
42). In negotiations, the NPA used the language of a Marshall
Plan-style “big push” to advance the case for investment in
strategic areas. However, with Uganda recently graduated
from HIPC status there was little appetite for increased bor-
rowing as a means of covering this deﬁcit, and the Governor
of BoU remained steadfast. Following tough negotiations, it
was agreed that the NDP could be funded to a level that would
involve a budget deﬁcit of between 6% and 7%, to be achieved
in part by rolling over some programs into the next cycle. De-
spite this deal, the struggle between those prioritizing large
investments on the one hand and macroeconomic stability
on the other would rumble on.
The ﬁnal stages of producing the NDP reﬂected continued
tensions around who owns development policy-making in
Uganda. By a mixture of accident and design, the timing of
the NDP launch was more closely linked to the imperatives
of external actors than key national policy processes. By the
time the NDP was ﬁnally ready in April 2010, having gained
Cabinet approval in February, there was little opportunity
for the NDP to have a serious inﬂuence on the budgetary allo-
cations for that year. However, the launch process did dovetail
neatly with the timetables of the IFIs, most notably the Bank’s
new Country Assistance Strategy, issued in May 2010, and the
IMF’s latest review of Uganda’s Policy Support Instrument
(PSI). 14 Given that a successful PSI review sends a favorable
signal to international investors and donors regarding a coun-
try’s investment climate, the government was keen to get this
in place and saw IFI-approval of the NDP as helping this pro-
cess. Uganda then submitted its draft NDP for a Joint Staﬀs
Assessment in February, before showing it to Parliament. 15
Once the government had received IFI-approval for the
NDP at the end of March (IMF/WB, 2010), and with future
borrowing needs likely secured through the new PSI agree-
ment (also approved in-country in March and later conﬁrmed
at an IMF Board meeting on May 12), the launch date for the
NDP was set for Monday April 19, 2010.
The launch itself was further characterized by the new poli-
tics of making development policy described above. According
to one senior NPA oﬃcial, the Constitutional requirement to
present the Plan to parliament “had escaped us, kind of”
(Interview, May 2010). The Plan was eventually submitted
to the Parliamentary Finance Committee on Tuesday April
13, less than a week before the planned launch, with instruc-
tions to have feedback for the House on Thursday April 15.
This was despite the fact that the House would be in recess
on Wednesday April 14, as the main opposition party had al-
ready arranged a delegates’ conference for that day. Parlia-
ment rejected the NDP, 16 Although Parliament rejected the
NDP, the launch went ahead as planned. In his speech at
the NDP launch, the President strongly welcomed what he
claimed as a “homegrown” Plan with one national newspaper
reporting that “Museveni cautioned donors against directinggovernment on how to develop the country, saying ‘We invited
development partners to feed into the plan so that they don’t
(direct)’.” 17 Presiding over the launch, the Minister of Plan-
ning concurred, repeating the mantra that, “Mr. President,
this is your vision” (Interview, June 2010). The next section
analyzes the content of the NDP approach to development
in relation to the foregoing poverty agenda and also examines
its inﬂuence on successive budgetary allocations, before
returning to this issue of ownership in Section 5.4. THE NDP AGENDA: TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM?
“A Transformed Ugandan Society from a Peasant to a Modern and
Prosperous Society: Growth, Employment and Socio-Economic
Transformation for Prosperity” (Uganda’s National Development
Plan, Government of Uganda 2010).
“This is a paradigm shift, absolutely. . .PEAP was about poverty this
one brings in economic growth, employment, skills development, pro-
ductivity, value addition. . .” (NPA Executive Director, Interview June
2010).(a) The NDP’s development agenda
The Vision and Theme of Uganda’s NDP cited above dis-
misses talk of “poverty reduction” as too limited a goal for
the country, particularly given the promise of oil wealth on
the horizon. Indeed, the Plan can be read as a means of
upgrading the country’s infrastructure to ensure that the oil re-
serves are fully exploited when they come on stream later this
decade. In an emblematic move, the much-quoted PEAP goal
of reducing the proportion of Uganda’s population living in
poverty to 10% by 2017 is replaced by the aim of ensuring mid-
dle-income status by the same date (Republic of Uganda,
2010).
The NDP proposes an alternative conceptualization of how
development should unfold in Uganda as compared to the
PEAP. As indicated in Figure 2, the focus is on how to sup-
port the productive sectors of the economy, conceived here
as the “yolk” of Uganda’s development egg. This includes
but goes beyond agriculture to identify the relatively new areas
of mining, oil and gas, and also higher-value activities such as
manufacturing and information and communication technolo-
gies. Whereas the previous PEAP was organized around pil-
lars, which implied a semblance of equality between, for
example, growth and improved quality of life, the hierarchical
ordering of priorities is now much clearer. Here the social sec-
tors, including the PAF areas of water, sanitation, health, and
education, are downgraded to the third layer in favor of sec-
tors associated with production and employment, with the
NDP including a long list of mega-projects, particularly in
the roads and energy sectors. There are also eﬀorts to
“upgrade” the policy focus within most sectors, as with the
shift within the education sector from a focus on primary to
a stronger focus on tertiary education, and away from small-
scale production to agro-processing in agriculture. Other po-
tential drivers of growth, such as small and medium-sized
enterprises are also emphasized (Ishengoma & Kappel, 2011).
Despite the oft-expressed concern that national develop-
ment policies need to be linked more closely to the process
of determining budgetary allocations (OPM, 2008), the NDP
arrived too late to formally inﬂuence the 2010–11 budget.
Nonetheless, a number of NDP priorities were featured and
the President referred directly to the NDP toward the end of
his budget speech in June 2010. A concerted eﬀort was then
made by NPA and MFPED to ensure that the Plan was tightly
integrated within the 2011–12 budget. Ministries and local
Figure 3. 2011–12 budget allocations per sector. Source: Background to the budget, 2011–12.
Figure 2. The NDP concept of development. Source: Republic of Uganda (2010).
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about aligning their budget framework papers with NDP pri-
orities. NPA also attended the MFPED-led workshops with
local governments to guide them on priorities, later verifying
that the local government budget framework papers were
aligned with NDP priorities.
The 2011–12 budget speech delivered to Parliament in June
9, 2011 did generally reﬂect NDP priorities. The declining
fortunes of PAF allocations since 2008–9 was further under-
lined in favor of a strong emphasis on investments in infra-
structure, with energy and roads together receiving over a
quarter of the overall settlement and the Energy & MineralDevelopment sector receiving a 160% increased in its alloca-
tion (see Figure 3). However, there were also some apparent
inconsistencies regarding NDP priorities, as with the failure
to increase investments in agriculture, which the NDP empha-
sizes as critical for modernisation.
(b) How pro-poor is the NDP?
It is too soon to oﬀer a deﬁnitive judgement on whether the
NDP is likely to be more or less pro-poor than its predecessors,
including over what timeframe. Although budgetary
allocations have shifted, NDP priorities have yet to be imple-
Figure 4. Budget priorities shift away from PAF areas. Source: 1997–98–2005–06 (PEAP evaluation: Poverty Status Report 2005); 2006–10 (Budget
Performance Report); 2010–11: National Budget Framework Paper 10/11–14/15; 2011–12: National Budget Framework Paper 11/12–15/15. NB: ﬁgures for
2008–9 exclude donor funding. Figures on left-hand axis are in Ugandan Schillings (bn).
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years before many of these (e.g., major hydroelectricity pro-
jects, roads, bridges) will be developed let alone have an impact
on living standards. Nonetheless, it is possible to assess the
strategic direction proposed by the NDP in relation to the char-
acter of poverty in Uganda and what is known about pro-poor
growth and development in this context and more broadly.
According to the NPA, “the diﬀerence between the PEAPs
and the NDP is the balance between poverty reduction and
development” (Interview with NPA Chairman, June 2010).
One of the indicators of this relative shift is the declining
importance given to PAF expenditures. Figure 4 reveals that
PAF’s share of the total budget has plummeted from a high
of nearly 35% in 2007–8 to its current projected level of
9.7%. This fall can be accounted for to some extent by the re-
moval of some items that used to be considered under PAF
from 2009 to 2010 onwards (MFPED, 2008). Nonetheless, in
a context of increased ﬁscal space, the Government has clearly
decided not to deepen its commitment to PAF areas but to shift
the emphasis elsewhere. Levels of expenditure in health and
education will remain signiﬁcant, but mainly in relation to ear-
lier commitments and recurrent expenditure, that is, through a
residual rather than a renewed focus on these sectors.
This is not necessarily “anti-poor,” and it has become
increasingly clear that agriculture and infrastructure, both of
which are critical to securing of “pro-growth” (e.g., Besley &
Cord, 2007), have been subject to low levels of investment in
Uganda and across Africa for over two decades. There is also
plenty of evidence to suggest that structural transformation of
the economy, involving a broad shift from agricultural to
manufacturing, labor-intensive forms of production and pro-
gressive moves up the value chain in terms of the goods being
produced for export markets oﬀers a sustainable route to
large-scale poverty over the long-run (Khan, 2005). 18 In a
powerful critique not only of the Washington Consensus but
also its PWC successor, Gore (2000) identiﬁed a “Southern
Consensus” that better reﬂected the postwar development suc-
cesses experienced in East Asia and Latin America. The key
tenets of this Southern Consensus diverge sharply from either
the Washington or PWC:1. Strategic integration into global economy.
2. Growth and structural change by “productive develop-
ment policy” (ﬁscal discipline; full capital and human
employment; human capital formation).
3. A developmental state linking government and business
co-operation (state facilitation of private sector-led
development; state role in overcoming technology
imperfections).
4. The managing of distribution and growth to ensure pro-
ductive employment e.g., agrarian reform.
5. Regional integration and co-operation (Gore, 2000).
The NDP agenda bears a striking resemblance to this South-
ern Consensus, particularly the clear shift to a focus on
employment, state facilitation of private sector-led develop-
ment, and also on regional integration through a strong recog-
nition of the importance of the East African Community
(Republic of Uganda, 2010). Although ﬁscal discipline has
been tested of late, particularly during the election year of
2011, the underlying commitment seems to strong macro-
economic governance remain in place.
However, there are important gaps elsewhere, perhaps most
strikingly in a lack of attention to human capital formation;
the limited role envisaged for the state in terms of closing
the technology gap; and the absence of a clear strategy around
how the state will seek to manage growth and (re)distribution.
Indeed, it is very diﬃcult to identify clear examples of how the
overall vision of transformation has been thought through in
distributive terms, whether over the short- or long-term, and
with particular reference to the critical areas of agriculture,
employment, social protection, and spatial inequality.
(i) Agriculture
As the NDP recognizes, a majority of poor Ugandans still
rely heavily on the agricultural sector to generate income.
However, whereas the pro-poor growth that Uganda experi-
enced during the 1990s was based largely around the increased
gains experienced by small-holders (predominantly in the cof-
fee sector, Kappel, Lay, & Steiner, 2005), the NDP focuses
mainly on farmers with larger land holdings. The intention is
to re-order the political economy of agriculture on a wider
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mies of scale around speciﬁc commodities, which can then sup-
port agricultural trade and agro-processing in a more
sustainable manner. Eﬀorts will be made to select and intervene
in strategic commodities, as determined according to available
export markets in the country and region more broadly. 19
This marks a return to earlier policy debates around the
development of strategic agricultural commodities (Kappel
et al., 2005); however, and as then, agriculture remains subject
to under-investment and continues to lack a clear policy direc-
tion. In addition to capping expenditure for the sector at less
than 5% in the 2011–12 budget, the same budget announced
a tax-reduction on hoes, which hardly reﬂects a drive to mod-
ernize the sector. Civil society critics consider it “a tragedy
that a sector that employs over 70% of Ugandans gets only
approximately 5% budget allocation” (UNGF, 2009, pp. 15),
particularly when regional bodies such as the EAC and AU
advocate budgetary allocations of around 15% of the national
budget for agriculture (cf. APRM, 2009, pp. 142). There is
clearly a lack of government conﬁdence in the sector, which
has experienced an apparent freefall in terms of its contribu-
tion to GDP over the past 20 years. The Plan also has little
to contribute on land reform, despite its critical importance
to poverty reduction in Uganda (Krishna et al., 2006).
(ii) Employment
As such, the exit routes from agriculture into agro-process-
ing in Uganda (let alone the urban-based manufacturing sec-
tor), remain limited. A leading expert in the agricultural
sector notes that, “The employment links are not very explicit
as an objective in the agricultural strategy for the NDP (Inter-
view, June 2010), while a contributor to the NDP’s diagnostic
basis admits that “the projects that will create employment are
not thought through in the Plan” (Interview, February 2011).
This is strongly reﬂected in the 2011–12 budget, which seeks to
support employment-creation through stand-alone schemes
and projects rather than at the strategic level of promoting la-
bor-intensive forms of growth in particular sectors.
This has serious implications for the whole NDP agenda in
Uganda. According to one oﬃcial within MFPED,
“a major factor driving the modernization agenda in Uganda (is) the
pressure from growing youth unemployment. This perhaps more than
anything else explains the pressure on government to focus on job cre-
ation through creating new sources of economic growth. Hence the
thrust of investment in energy, roads, ICT, agriculture, etc.” (Personal
communication, February 2011).
However, Uganda has yet to plot a coherent way forward
here. Most investment in recent years has been in sectors that
are capital- rather than labor-intensive (e.g., telecommunica-
tions, banking) with much slower job-creation in large-scale
agriculture or manufacturing (World Bank, 2007), a trend that
looks set to continue with the current move into oil production.
(iii) Social protection
Where capital-intensive strategies become the preferred
mode of development, this arguably places a higher burden
on the state to redistribute wealth through the ﬁscal system
and seek to maintain social stability amidst high-levels of
unemployment in this way. However, there is very little indica-
tion that the government in Uganda is planning signiﬁcant
investment in social protection. Although the NDP does con-
tain four pages on social protection and two (related) cash-
transfer programs are currently being rolled out, these remain
heavily reliant on donor funding and expertise, and levels of
government funding and ownership (outside the committed
but structurally weak Ministry of Gender, Labor and SocialDevelopment) remains minimal. Indeed, the Social Develop-
ment sector’s projected share of the budget is set to decline
rather than increase over the period of the current Medium
Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) (MFPED, 2011, 60).
It is therefore unclear as to what provision will be available
for those unable to gain a foothold in whatever employment
opportunities do emerge through the new policy direction
mapped out by the NDP.
(iv) Spatial inequality
The apparent failure within the NDP to make the links be-
tween its overall strategy and the most pressing problems of
impoverishment in Uganda is further evidenced in its ap-
proach to spatial inequality. Despite the post-conﬂict dividend
currently beneﬁting Northern Uganda, poverty in the country
remains heavily regionalized, with the North and East experi-
encing the severest and most long-run problems with poverty
(CPRC-Uganda, 2005; Nandy, 2008; World Bank, 2007).
The routes to escaping poverty also diﬀer markedly between
regions, suggesting a strong case for a regionally diﬀerentiated
policy approach (Krishna et al., 2006). The NDP does propose
some “aﬃrmative action” for these regions, including a re-
stated commitment to the Post-Conﬂict Recovery and Devel-
opment Programme for the north. However, much of the
Plan tends to blame the poor of these regions for their poverty,
with attention drawn to the cultural rather than political econ-
omy aspects of under-development in these regions (e.g.,
Republic of Uganda, 2010). This ideological bias toward a
residualist reading of poverty has led to inappropriate policy
solutions for the north in the past (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey,
2010), a problem that looks set to be repeated here, with the
main focus falling on localized economic activities for the
north (Republic of Uganda, 2010, pp. 360–369), rather than
any serious attempt to rebalance the political economy of
the country and work out an integrated development strategy
that joins the north up with infrastructure and markets at na-
tional and regional levels.
(c) A paradigm shift?
The NDP certainly marks a distinctive turn away from a
poverty agenda, at least in its PRSP-guise and associated
emphasis on social sector investments. However, does it mark
a new paradigmatic direction for development in Uganda or
simply a return to the growth-based focus of neoliberalism
(Sheppard & Leitner, 2010)? Despite some initial rhetoric from
MFPED oﬃcials about this being a “growth, growth, growth”
agenda (Interviews, 2008), what is being advanced here is a
distinctly productivist agenda that has more in common with
Gore’s (2000) “Southern Consensus” than the free market
growth paradigm of the 1980s. The insistence on market
liberalization within the Washington Consensus not only
ignored the importance of investing in infrastructure, but also
tended to encourage rentier forms of capitalism that further
undermined the productive base of the economy. 20 However,
although the NDP is certainly seeking to move Uganda
toward a more productivist political economy of development,
its failure to articulate a coherent strategic way forward in
terms of growth, employment, and redistribution is a serious
ﬂaw and reduces its claims to oﬀer a distinctive paradigmatic
approach. It is also highly doubtful that Uganda possesses
the type of developmental state required to implement this
proposed new agenda anytime soon (see below). Moreover,
the question of whether the NDP represents a move toward
a Southern Consensus is further confused by the fact that
the Washington-based brokers of development knowledge ap-
pear to have also shifted in the same ideological direction.
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CONTROLS DEVELOPMENT IN UGANDA
(a) Between ownership and sovereignty
This section returns the question of who “owns” the new
development agenda in Uganda—or in Whitﬁeld’s (2009) use-
ful reformulation, whether Uganda has moved beyond “own-
ership via donor inﬂuence” to a position of exerting “sovereign
control” over its development policy—and the related issue of
whether the NDP is likely to be implemented.
Although donors were far less involved in the actual process
of producing the NDP as compared to the PEAP, the IFIs in
particular had already exerted a signiﬁcant amount of inﬂu-
ence, most notably through the World Bank’s (2007) Country
Memorandum. As a senior IFI source in Uganda attests, “the
main aim (of Country Memos) will be to inﬂuence the policy
formulation of government” (Interview, February 2011), an
aim that was clearly achieved given that the Memo’s primary
recommendation, namely “the need for Ugandan policy mak-
ers to pro-actively steer structural transformation and job cre-
ation through public policies and targeted investments” (World
Bank, 2007, 3) was adopted wholesale in the NDP. Although
the Bank set out to be consultative in this process, and govern-
ment oﬃcials report feeding in their ideas at the start, Bank
oﬃcials admit that there was a tendency to push government
along this “consultative” process in order to meet tight internal
timetables. A leading parliamentarian, and then Chair of the
Parliamentary Network on the World Bank, noted that “The
paper of the World Bank was driven much more fastly than
the NDP process, and so it informed the NDP very much;
the NPA is still young and a weak ﬁsh. . .the Country Memo
was very inﬂuential” (Interview, February 2011).
However, the same politician also sees the “NDP as some-
thingmuchmore government owned than the previous PEAP.”
(Interview, February 2011), and senior insiders state that, while
there was an eﬀort to harmonize theNDP process with the time-
tables of the IFIs, this was a strategic decision, “not to be inﬂu-
enced but to learn best-practice and get the global picture from
them. . .also to get them conﬁdent, keep them on board” (Inter-
view, February 2011). Likewise, the World Bank oﬃcials pro-
ducing the Memo admit that they bore in mind the President’s
preference for a discourse of transformation. The experience
of the NDP process suggests that Uganda is currently located
somewhere in between the diﬀerent models of “sovereign con-
trol” and “ownership via donor inﬂuence” (Whitﬁeld, 2009).
The contradictions within such a state of aﬀairs are captured
in the words of a senior IFI oﬃcial based in Kampala:
“the IMF really gets the ownership thing in ways we didn’t 10 years
ago. Countries. . .are not dependent on our money but are on our ad-
vice and approval” (Interview, June 2010).
This in turn suggests the need for a diﬀerent conception of
sovereignty, as argued for by Harrison (2004), which concen-
trates less on a strong distinction between internal and exter-
nal actors and instead views sovereignty as a “frontier”
which “. . .is formed by the interaction of forces therein, rather
than by the delimitation between one space and another”
(Harrison, 2004, pp. 25–26). 21
As the politics of development in Uganda has shifted, so
have the types of relationships that are required to sustain
particular policy agendas. It is feasible that Presidential talk
of modernization constitutes the most recent attempt by
Museveni to triangulate his concerns with the interests of
those he needs to stay in power and pursue his current pro-
ject. 22 For much of the late 1990s and early 2000s, it clearlysuited Museveni to play the poverty card given his heavy reli-
ance on support from particular donors who were leading this
new agenda, and also because of the electoral popularity it
helped to secure for him via populist give-aways. That his rhet-
oric of “modernization” has come so strongly to the fore over
the past few years similarly ﬁts well with the agenda of those
providing new sources of ﬁnancial support and investment,
most notably China but also other countries and companies
looking to invest in the exploitation of oil and the infrastruc-
tural development associated with this. The fact that the
World Bank is using much the same rhetoric of “transforma-
tion” suggests that the IFIs are as much running to catch-up
with as leading the new zeitgeist (cf. Sheppard & Leitner,
2010), often in response to some of the same underlying driv-
ers. 23 Given that the President has a long-held vision of Ugan-
da as a modern country that pre-dates these drivers, including
the discovery of signiﬁcant oil ﬁnds, it seems possible that the
new agenda of transformation may command deeper levels of
“ownership” than would have occurred even if the decade of
eﬀorts to “nationalize the poverty agenda” (Toye, 1999) had
been further prolonged.
(b) Will the NDP be implemented?
The extent to which the NDP will be implemented success-
fully remains an open question. Although space precludes a
fuller investigation of this issue here (see Hickey, 2011), it
seems likely that this will be shaped to a large extent by three
inter-related factors, including the state of the economy and
resource mobilization, the level of state capacity, and the
strength and nature of the relationships that the government
is able to forge in support of this new agenda. Although the
NDP has clearly had an inﬂuence over the most recent budget-
ary allocations, the ﬁscal space during its ﬁrst two years of
existence has been constrained and implementation limited,
not least as a result of ﬁnancial mismanagement around the
2011 elections. At a deeper level, there is little evidence that
the economy is structurally ready for “take oﬀ” (Selassie,
2008), something that would actually require a reversal of re-
cent trends. The economy is facing a diﬃcult time, character-
ized by high inﬂation, a growing balance of payments deﬁcit,
depleted foreign reserves and a ﬂat lining tax take. With some
donors increasingly willing to withdraw general budgetary
support when they perceive government to be under- or mis-
performing, the Government is increasingly considering taking
loans from new sources in order fund the major investments
prioritized by the NDP. However, this will only ease the ten-
sions between increased investment and macroeconomic sta-
bility if a return to high-levels of indebtedness is avoided.
Proceeds from oil may well help bridge the ﬁnancing gaps be-
tween the current budget and the ambitions laid out in the
NDP, but there are clear concerns that this will deepen the
rent-seeking as opposed to productive features of Uganda’s
political economy, and also tend to involve capital- rather
than labor-intensive forms of growth.
However, the most signiﬁcant binding constraint that Ugan-
da faces in seeking to deliver on its new development agenda is
its lack of a developmental state. Structural transformation is
no mean feat, and modern history suggests that it requires not
only high-levels of political commitment and resources but
also a high degree of state capacity (Gore, 2000; World Bank,
2008). Uganda clearly lacks the type of developmental state
that is required to deliver either the forms of capitalist accu-
mulation or service delivery demanded here, and appears to
be exhibiting a deepening of the neopatrimonial tendencies
which tend to undermine prospects for development (Kjaer
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politics of policy processes, the iron triangle of actors who
underpinned the PRSP-experiment, namely “traditional” do-
nors, the Ministry of Finance and CSOs, have increasingly gi-
ven way to non-traditional donors, the NPA and private
sector organizations in terms of inﬂuence over the develop-
ment policy agenda. However, this new set of actors each lack
the same level of capacity and inﬂuence over policy-making
that the former actors held, and remain poorly co-ordinated,
both within and between themselves. In particular, and as ex-
plored in greater depth elsewhere (Hickey, in press), while the
Civil Society tendency has been displaced, the “new productiv-
ists” that have recently emerged within the Finance Ministry
tendency to represent an alternative approach to that of the
neoliberals, currently lack the capacity and inﬂuence to win
the argument for much higher-levels of investment vis-a`-vis
the residual emphasis on keeping expenditure constrained
within MTEF ceilings in the cause of macroeconomic stability.
As such, the new paradigm of structural transformation cur-
rently lacks the agency on the ground required to move ahead.6. CONCLUSION
The politics of development, in Uganda and beyond, has
shifted signiﬁcantly in recent years, in ways that appear to
have important implications for the future of the poverty
agenda leading up to the Millennium Development Goals
deadline of 2015. The analysis oﬀered here suggests that the
poverty agenda in Uganda was enabled and sustained by a
particular set of political and political economy conditions, re-
volving most critically around shifting patterns of geopolitics,
the global ﬂows of resources and ideas, and domestic political
power arrangements (both formal and informal). These condi-
tions were largely displaced during the mid-2000s by a new set
of drivers more conducive to a project of growth and struc-
tural transformation. The discovery of potentially signiﬁcant
levels of oil wealth, the growing inﬂuence of new donors and
the return of multi-party politics all served to embolden thePresident’s long-held ambition of emulating the East Asian
miracles. This converged with the ideological shifts taking
place within the development mainstream which, in recogni-
tion of shifting patterns of wealth and global power and also
the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, tended to undermine the social-
orientation of the previous PWC in favor of an increased focus
on productivity. This shift was further enabled in Uganda by
the move toward a longer-term planning cycle and the in-
creased space opened up for a new “Planning Tendency” to
emerge within (and increasingly beyond) the Finance Ministry
tendency. Uganda now has greater space to deﬁne its own
development future, although its ideas on how to do so remain
closely inﬂuenced by IFIs whose ideological agenda has been
(not co-incidentally) traveling in the same direction.
The new agenda is arguably grounded in a stronger evidence
base than the previous one in terms what has historically
worked for poor countries (Gore, 2000), and also oﬀers a wel-
come antidote to the apparent betrayal of even the prospect of
modernity for poor countries within the minimalism of the
poverty agenda (Hickey, 2005). However, there is little evi-
dence at this stage that the NDP’s proposed route toward
transformation is coherent in terms of its redistributive out-
comes, or that it will be implemented. 24 Although the types
of relationships between certain policy actors that under-
pinned the PEAP have been cast aside, they have yet to be full
replaced by relationships between new actors that can give the
structural transformation agenda the arms and legs it needs to
move on the ground. The absence of a developmental state to
a large extent reﬂects the lack of productive as opposed to cli-
entelistic relationships both within Uganda’s political elite,
and between political and economic elites. Finally, it is also
clear that projects of developmental nationalism such as the
one envisaged here have become even more problematic in a
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down of the state. As such, it may be some time before the
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poverty agenda, refusing to attach even the most limited “social
dimensions of adjustment” programs in the early 1990s.
6. See Makara, Rakner, & Svasand (2009) for an insightful discussion of
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politics on development policy in Uganda are the subject of a separate
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7. This chimes with the views of one inﬂuential insider who notes that,
“. . .the impact of budget allocations diminished with each iteration of the
PEAP. As a result, less attention has been paid to the instrument by
government institutions” (Mugambe, 2010, p. 170).
8. For example, in 2001 China “. . .agreed to commence drilling for oil on
Lake Albert in western Uganda and extended grants and free loans,
including for the building of a $40 million food research facility” (Lee,
2007, pp. 29–30).
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named Budgetary Monitoring and Accountability Unit (Interviews,
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13. The consultations with local governments in early 2009 involved
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However, the time allowed for this data-gathering was minimal and it is
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interviews with local government oﬃcials in two districts, Busia and
Kamuli, undertaken by Badru Bukenya in March 2011).
14. According to the IMF, “The Policy Support Instrument (PSI)
supports low-income countries that do not want—or need—Fund
ﬁnancial assistance but seek to consolidate their economic performance
with IMF monitoring and support (IMF PSI Factsheet).”
15. Completed on March 31, 2010, the JSA was broadly positive,
praising the overall focus on structural transformation within strict
macroeconomic constraints, while raising concerns that weak governance
and exogenous shocks may knock the plan oﬀ course (IMF/WB, 2010). It
was formally approved in Washington in May 2010.
16. Interviews (May–June 2010); Daily Monitor report 22 April 2010.
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